Compare commits

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16 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Olivier Dumont
3f2f813902 Trigger automated review 2025-12-30 14:22:53 +01:00
Olivier Dumont
014550f80e CRITICAL: Add audience validation for access tokens
Access tokens include an 'aud' (audience) claim set to the client ID,
but this was never validated during token validation. This allowed
tokens issued for one client to be used by another client, violating
the OAuth 2.0 security model.

Changes:
- Add ValidateAccessTokenForClient method that validates audience
  if expectedClientID is provided
- Update ValidateAccessToken to call ValidateAccessTokenForClient
  (backward compatible, no audience check if not specified)
- Update userinfo endpoint to accept optional client_id parameter
  and validate token audience matches it

Security impact:
- Prevents token reuse across different clients
- Ensures tokens are scoped to specific clients as intended
- Prevents attackers from using tokens issued for one client to
  access resources protected by another client
2025-12-30 14:10:50 +01:00
Olivier Dumont
5ec9989189 Remove redundant 'openid' scope special case logic
The special case for adding 'openid' scope was redundant and could
potentially bypass client scope restrictions. The main loop already
correctly adds 'openid' to validScopes if it's in both requestedScopes
and allowedScopes.

Since 'openid' is already in the default scopes during client
configuration (SyncClientsFromConfig), it will be available for
clients that don't explicitly configure scopes. Clients can include
or exclude 'openid' in their allowedScopes as needed.

This ensures consistent enforcement of client scope restrictions
with no special-case bypasses.
2025-12-30 13:52:01 +01:00
Olivier Dumont
ad12110fbf Replace SHA256 with HKDF for key derivation and fix scope validation
Security improvements:

1. HKDF key derivation:
   - Replace raw sha256.Sum256() with proper HKDF (HMAC-based KDF)
   - Uses domain-separated label 'oidc-aes-256-key-v1' for key derivation
   - Applied to both encryptPrivateKey and decryptPrivateKey
   - Provides better security properties than raw hash

2. Scope validation fix:
   - Only add 'openid' scope if it's both requested AND in client's
     allowedScopes
   - Prevents bypassing client scope restrictions
   - Respects configured allowedScopes

Both changes improve security posture while maintaining backward
compatibility.
2025-12-30 13:37:43 +01:00
Olivier Dumont
ca74534048 Add bcrypt hashing for client secrets and RSA key encryption
Security improvements:

1. Client secret hashing:
   - Replace plaintext comparison with bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword
   - Provides constant-time comparison to prevent timing attacks
   - Hash secrets with bcrypt before storing in database
   - Update SyncClientsFromConfig to hash incoming plaintext secrets

2. Deterministic RSA key loading:
   - Load most recently created key using ORDER BY created_at DESC
   - Add warning if multiple keys detected in database
   - Ensures consistent key selection on startup

3. Optional RSA key encryption:
   - Encrypt private keys with AES-256-GCM when OIDC_RSA_MASTER_KEY is set
   - Master key derived via SHA256 from environment variable
   - Backward compatible: stores plaintext if no master key set
   - Automatic detection of encrypted vs plaintext on load

All changes maintain backward compatibility with existing deployments.
2025-12-30 13:26:06 +01:00
Olivier Dumont
1b37096b58 CRITICAL: Add replay protection for authorization codes
Authorization codes were implemented as stateless JWTs with no tracking,
allowing the same code to be exchanged for tokens multiple times. This
violates OAuth 2.0 RFC 6749 Section 4.1.2 which mandates that authorization
codes MUST be single-use.

This change:
- Adds oidc_authorization_codes table to track code usage
- Stores authorization codes in database when generated
- Validates code exists and hasn't been used before exchange
- Marks code as used immediately after validation
- Prevents replay attacks where intercepted codes could be reused

Security impact:
- Prevents attackers from reusing intercepted authorization codes
- Ensures compliance with OAuth 2.0 security requirements
- Adds database-backed single-use enforcement
2025-12-30 13:00:19 +01:00
Olivier Dumont
cd068d16c2 Fix Python scoping issue: rename html variable to avoid conflict
The variable 'html' was being assigned to store HTML content, which
caused Python to treat 'html' as a local variable throughout the
function. This prevented access to the 'html' module (imported at
the top) within f-strings that referenced html.escape().

Renamed the HTML content variable to 'html_content' to avoid the
naming conflict with the html module.
2025-12-30 12:52:53 +01:00
Olivier Dumont
5b5799ab62 Fix XSS vulnerability: Escape user claims in HTML output
User claims from ID tokens (username, name, email) were directly
interpolated into HTML without escaping, allowing XSS attacks if
malicious content was present in claims.

This fix:
- Imports html module for escaping
- Escapes all user-controlled data before rendering in HTML
- Escapes JSON output in pre tags as well
- Prevents execution of malicious scripts in browser
2025-12-30 12:46:03 +01:00
Olivier Dumont
672914ceb7 Remove insecure query parameter fallback for client credentials
The discovery document only advertises client_secret_basic and
client_secret_post as supported authentication methods. Query parameters
are insecure because they are:
- Logged in access logs
- Stored in browser history
- Exposed in referrer headers

This fix removes the query parameter fallback, ensuring client secrets
are only accepted via:
- Authorization header (client_secret_basic)
- POST form body (client_secret_post)

This aligns the implementation with the advertised capabilities and
prevents client secret exposure through query strings.
2025-12-30 12:40:55 +01:00
Olivier Dumont
f006ebe5e4 Fix open redirect vulnerability in authorize endpoint
Per OAuth 2.0 RFC 6749 §4.1.2.1, errors should NOT redirect to
unvalidated redirect_uri values. This fix:

- Returns JSON errors for failures before redirect_uri validation
  (missing parameters, invalid client)
- Only redirects to redirect_uri after it has been validated
  against registered client URIs
- Prevents open redirect attacks where malicious redirect_uri
  values could be used to redirect users to attacker-controlled sites
2025-12-30 12:40:01 +01:00
Olivier Dumont
dabb4398ad Implement PKCE (Proof Key for Code Exchange) support
PKCE was advertised in the discovery document but not actually implemented.
This commit adds full PKCE support:

- Store code_challenge and code_challenge_method in authorization code JWT
- Accept code_verifier parameter in token endpoint
- Validate code_verifier against stored code_challenge
- Support both S256 (SHA256) and plain code challenge methods
- PKCE validation is required when code_challenge is present

This prevents authorization code interception attacks by requiring
the client to prove possession of the code_verifier that was used
to generate the code_challenge.
2025-12-30 12:39:00 +01:00
Olivier Dumont
ef157ae9ba Fix critical security issue: verify JWT signature in access token validation
The validateAccessToken method was only decoding the JWT payload without
verifying the signature, allowing attackers to forge tokens. This fix:

- Adds ValidateAccessToken method to OIDCService that properly verifies
  JWT signature using RSA public key
- Validates issuer, expiration, and required claims
- Updates controller to use the secure validation method
- Removes insecure manual JWT parsing code
2025-12-30 12:36:30 +01:00
Olivier Dumont
020fcb9878 Add OIDC provider functionality with validation setup
This commit adds OpenID Connect (OIDC) provider functionality to tinyauth,
allowing it to act as an OIDC identity provider for other applications.

Features:
- OIDC discovery endpoint at /.well-known/openid-configuration
- Authorization endpoint for OAuth 2.0 authorization code flow
- Token endpoint for exchanging authorization codes for tokens
- ID token generation with JWT signing
- JWKS endpoint for public key distribution
- Support for PKCE (code challenge/verifier)
- Nonce validation for ID tokens
- Configurable OIDC clients with redirect URIs, scopes, and grant types

Validation:
- Docker Compose setup for local testing
- OIDC test client (oidc-whoami) with session management
- Nginx reverse proxy configuration
- DNS server (dnsmasq) for custom domain resolution
- Chrome launch script for easy testing

Configuration:
- OIDC configuration in config.yaml
- Example configuration in config.example.yaml
- Database migrations for OIDC client storage
2025-12-30 12:17:55 +01:00
Stavros
986ac88e14 Merge branch 'main' of https://github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth 2025-12-29 19:46:38 +02:00
Stavros
b159f44729 fix: add missing ldap search filter 2025-12-29 19:46:33 +02:00
Stavros
43487d44f7 feat: forward sub from oidc providers (#543)
* feat: forward sub from oidc providers

* fix: review comments
2025-12-26 19:02:51 +02:00
40 changed files with 2309 additions and 21 deletions

1
.review_trigger Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
# Trigger automated review

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@@ -34,6 +34,10 @@ func NewTinyauthCmdConfiguration() *config.Config {
ForgotPasswordMessage: "You can change your password by changing the configuration.",
BackgroundImage: "/background.jpg",
},
Ldap: config.LdapConfig{
Insecure: false,
SearchFilter: "(uid=%s)",
},
Experimental: config.ExperimentalConfig{
ConfigFile: "",
},

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@@ -63,6 +63,42 @@ oauth:
# Allow insecure connections (self-signed certificates)
insecure: false
# OIDC Provider Configuration
oidc:
# Enable OIDC provider functionality
enabled: false
# OIDC issuer URL (defaults to appUrl if not set)
issuer: ""
# Access token expiry in seconds (3600 = 1 hour)
accessTokenExpiry: 3600
# ID token expiry in seconds (3600 = 1 hour)
idTokenExpiry: 3600
# OIDC Client Configuration
clients:
# Client ID (used as the key)
myapp:
# Client secret (or use clientSecretFile)
clientSecret: "your_client_secret_here"
# Path to file containing client secret (optional, alternative to clientSecret)
clientSecretFile: ""
# Client name for display purposes
clientName: "My Application"
# Allowed redirect URIs
redirectUris:
- "https://myapp.example.com/callback"
- "http://localhost:3000/callback"
# Allowed grant types (defaults to ["authorization_code"] if not specified)
grantTypes:
- "authorization_code"
# Allowed response types (defaults to ["code"] if not specified)
responseTypes:
- "code"
# Allowed scopes (defaults to ["openid", "profile", "email"] if not specified)
scopes:
- "openid"
- "profile"
- "email"
# UI Customization
ui:
# Custom title for login page

1
go.mod
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@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ require (
github.com/gin-gonic/gin v1.11.0
github.com/glebarez/sqlite v1.11.0
github.com/go-ldap/ldap/v3 v3.4.12
github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5 v5.3.0
github.com/golang-migrate/migrate/v4 v4.19.1
github.com/google/go-querystring v1.1.0
github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0

2
go.sum
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@@ -127,6 +127,8 @@ github.com/goccy/go-json v0.10.4/go.mod h1:oq7eo15ShAhp70Anwd5lgX2pLfOS3QCiwU/PU
github.com/goccy/go-yaml v1.18.0 h1:8W7wMFS12Pcas7KU+VVkaiCng+kG8QiFeFwzFb+rwuw=
github.com/goccy/go-yaml v1.18.0/go.mod h1:XBurs7gK8ATbW4ZPGKgcbrY1Br56PdM69F7LkFRi1kA=
github.com/godbus/dbus/v5 v5.0.4/go.mod h1:xhWf0FNVPg57R7Z0UbKHbJfkEywrmjJnf7w5xrFpKfA=
github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5 v5.3.0 h1:pv4AsKCKKZuqlgs5sUmn4x8UlGa0kEVt/puTpKx9vvo=
github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5 v5.3.0/go.mod h1:fxCRLWMO43lRc8nhHWY6LGqRcf+1gQWArsqaEUEa5bE=
github.com/golang-migrate/migrate/v4 v4.19.1 h1:OCyb44lFuQfYXYLx1SCxPZQGU7mcaZ7gH9yH4jSFbBA=
github.com/golang-migrate/migrate/v4 v4.19.1/go.mod h1:CTcgfjxhaUtsLipnLoQRWCrjYXycRz/g5+RWDuYgPrE=
github.com/google/go-cmp v0.5.2/go.mod h1:v8dTdLbMG2kIc/vJvl+f65V22dbkXbowE6jgT/gNBxE=

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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
ALTER TABLE "sessions" DROP COLUMN "oauth_sub";

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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
ALTER TABLE "sessions" ADD COLUMN "oauth_sub" TEXT;

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@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS "oidc_clients";

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@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS "oidc_clients" (
"client_id" TEXT NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY UNIQUE,
"client_secret" TEXT NOT NULL,
"client_name" TEXT NOT NULL,
"redirect_uris" TEXT NOT NULL,
"grant_types" TEXT NOT NULL,
"response_types" TEXT NOT NULL,
"scopes" TEXT NOT NULL,
"created_at" INTEGER NOT NULL,
"updated_at" INTEGER NOT NULL
);

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@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS "oidc_keys";

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@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS "oidc_keys" (
"id" INTEGER NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
"private_key" TEXT NOT NULL,
"created_at" INTEGER NOT NULL,
"updated_at" INTEGER NOT NULL
);

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@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
DROP INDEX IF EXISTS "idx_oidc_auth_codes_expires_at";
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS "oidc_authorization_codes";

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@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS "oidc_authorization_codes" (
"code" TEXT NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
"client_id" TEXT NOT NULL,
"redirect_uri" TEXT NOT NULL,
"used" BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
"expires_at" INTEGER NOT NULL,
"created_at" INTEGER NOT NULL
);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS "idx_oidc_auth_codes_expires_at" ON "oidc_authorization_codes"("expires_at");

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@@ -102,5 +102,15 @@ func (app *BootstrapApp) setupRouter() (*gin.Engine, error) {
healthController.SetupRoutes()
// Setup OIDC controller if OIDC is enabled
if app.config.OIDC.Enabled && app.services.oidcService != nil {
oidcController := controller.NewOIDCController(controller.OIDCControllerConfig{
AppURL: app.config.AppURL,
CookieDomain: app.context.cookieDomain,
}, apiRouter, app.services.oidcService, app.services.authService)
oidcController.SetupRoutes()
}
return engine, nil
}

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@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ type Services struct {
dockerService *service.DockerService
ldapService *service.LdapService
oauthBrokerService *service.OAuthBrokerService
oidcService *service.OIDCService
}
func (app *BootstrapApp) initServices() (Services, error) {
@@ -96,5 +97,39 @@ func (app *BootstrapApp) initServices() (Services, error) {
services.oauthBrokerService = oauthBrokerService
// Initialize OIDC service if enabled
if app.config.OIDC.Enabled {
issuer := app.config.OIDC.Issuer
if issuer == "" {
issuer = app.config.AppURL
}
oidcService := service.NewOIDCService(service.OIDCServiceConfig{
AppURL: app.config.AppURL,
Issuer: issuer,
AccessTokenExpiry: app.config.OIDC.AccessTokenExpiry,
IDTokenExpiry: app.config.OIDC.IDTokenExpiry,
Database: databaseService.GetDatabase(),
})
err = oidcService.Init()
if err != nil {
log.Warn().Err(err).Msg("Failed to initialize OIDC service, continuing without it")
} else {
services.oidcService = oidcService
log.Info().Msg("OIDC service initialized")
// Sync clients from config
if len(app.config.OIDC.Clients) > 0 {
err = oidcService.SyncClientsFromConfig(app.config.OIDC.Clients)
if err != nil {
log.Warn().Err(err).Msg("Failed to sync OIDC clients from config")
} else {
log.Info().Int("count", len(app.config.OIDC.Clients)).Msg("Synced OIDC clients from config")
}
}
}
}
return services, nil
}

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@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ type Config struct {
Server ServerConfig `description:"Server configuration." yaml:"server"`
Auth AuthConfig `description:"Authentication configuration." yaml:"auth"`
OAuth OAuthConfig `description:"OAuth configuration." yaml:"oauth"`
OIDC OIDCConfig `description:"OIDC provider configuration." yaml:"oidc"`
UI UIConfig `description:"UI customization." yaml:"ui"`
Ldap LdapConfig `description:"LDAP configuration." yaml:"ldap"`
Experimental ExperimentalConfig `description:"Experimental features, use with caution." yaml:"experimental"`
@@ -68,6 +69,24 @@ type LdapConfig struct {
SearchFilter string `description:"LDAP search filter." yaml:"searchFilter"`
}
type OIDCConfig struct {
Enabled bool `description:"Enable OIDC provider functionality." yaml:"enabled"`
Issuer string `description:"OIDC issuer URL (defaults to appUrl)." yaml:"issuer"`
AccessTokenExpiry int `description:"Access token expiry time in seconds." yaml:"accessTokenExpiry"`
IDTokenExpiry int `description:"ID token expiry time in seconds." yaml:"idTokenExpiry"`
Clients map[string]OIDCClientConfig `description:"OIDC client configurations." yaml:"clients"`
}
type OIDCClientConfig struct {
ClientSecret string `description:"OIDC client secret." yaml:"clientSecret"`
ClientSecretFile string `description:"Path to the file containing the OIDC client secret." yaml:"clientSecretFile"`
ClientName string `description:"Client name for display purposes." yaml:"clientName"`
RedirectURIs []string `description:"Allowed redirect URIs." yaml:"redirectUris"`
GrantTypes []string `description:"Allowed grant types (defaults to ['authorization_code'])." yaml:"grantTypes"`
ResponseTypes []string `description:"Allowed response types (defaults to ['code'])." yaml:"responseTypes"`
Scopes []string `description:"Allowed scopes (defaults to ['openid', 'profile', 'email'])." yaml:"scopes"`
}
type ExperimentalConfig struct {
ConfigFile string `description:"Path to config file." yaml:"-"`
}
@@ -79,6 +98,7 @@ const DefaultNamePrefix = "TINYAUTH_"
// OAuth/OIDC config
type Claims struct {
Sub string `json:"sub"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Email string `json:"email"`
PreferredUsername string `json:"preferred_username"`
@@ -125,6 +145,7 @@ type SessionCookie struct {
TotpPending bool
OAuthGroups string
OAuthName string
OAuthSub string
}
type UserContext struct {
@@ -138,6 +159,7 @@ type UserContext struct {
OAuthGroups string
TotpEnabled bool
OAuthName string
OAuthSub string
}
// API responses and queries

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@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ type UserContextResponse struct {
OAuth bool `json:"oauth"`
TotpPending bool `json:"totpPending"`
OAuthName string `json:"oauthName"`
OAuthSub string `json:"oauthSub"`
}
type AppContextResponse struct {
@@ -89,6 +90,7 @@ func (controller *ContextController) userContextHandler(c *gin.Context) {
OAuth: context.OAuth,
TotpPending: context.TotpPending,
OAuthName: context.OAuthName,
OAuthSub: context.OAuthSub,
}
if err != nil {

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@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ var userContext = config.UserContext{
TotpPending: false,
OAuthGroups: "",
TotpEnabled: false,
OAuthSub: "",
}
func setupContextController(middlewares *[]gin.HandlerFunc) (*gin.Engine, *httptest.ResponseRecorder) {

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@@ -197,6 +197,7 @@ func (controller *OAuthController) oauthCallbackHandler(c *gin.Context) {
Provider: req.Provider,
OAuthGroups: utils.CoalesceToString(user.Groups),
OAuthName: service.GetName(),
OAuthSub: user.Sub,
}
log.Trace().Interface("session_cookie", sessionCookie).Msg("Creating session cookie")

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@@ -0,0 +1,489 @@
package controller
import (
"encoding/base64"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strings"
"github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth/internal/config"
"github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth/internal/service"
"github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth/internal/utils"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
"github.com/rs/zerolog/log"
)
// OIDCControllerConfig holds configuration for the OIDC controller.
type OIDCControllerConfig struct {
AppURL string // Base URL of the application
CookieDomain string // Domain for setting cookies
}
// OIDCController handles OpenID Connect (OIDC) protocol endpoints.
// It implements the OIDC provider functionality including discovery, authorization,
// token exchange, userinfo, and JWKS endpoints.
type OIDCController struct {
config OIDCControllerConfig
router *gin.RouterGroup
oidc *service.OIDCService
auth *service.AuthService
}
// NewOIDCController creates a new OIDC controller with the given configuration and services.
func NewOIDCController(config OIDCControllerConfig, router *gin.RouterGroup, oidc *service.OIDCService, auth *service.AuthService) *OIDCController {
return &OIDCController{
config: config,
router: router,
oidc: oidc,
auth: auth,
}
}
// SetupRoutes registers all OIDC endpoints with the router.
// This includes:
// - /.well-known/openid-configuration - OIDC discovery endpoint
// - /oidc/authorize - Authorization endpoint
// - /oidc/token - Token endpoint
// - /oidc/userinfo - UserInfo endpoint
// - /oidc/jwks - JSON Web Key Set endpoint
func (controller *OIDCController) SetupRoutes() {
// Well-known discovery endpoint
controller.router.GET("/.well-known/openid-configuration", controller.discoveryHandler)
// OIDC endpoints
oidcGroup := controller.router.Group("/oidc")
oidcGroup.GET("/authorize", controller.authorizeHandler)
oidcGroup.POST("/token", controller.tokenHandler)
oidcGroup.GET("/userinfo", controller.userinfoHandler)
oidcGroup.GET("/jwks", controller.jwksHandler)
}
// discoveryHandler handles the OIDC discovery endpoint.
// Returns the OpenID Connect discovery document as specified in RFC 8414.
// The document contains metadata about the OIDC provider including endpoints,
// supported features, and cryptographic capabilities.
func (controller *OIDCController) discoveryHandler(c *gin.Context) {
issuer := controller.oidc.GetIssuer()
baseURL := strings.TrimSuffix(controller.config.AppURL, "/")
discovery := map[string]interface{}{
"issuer": issuer,
"authorization_endpoint": fmt.Sprintf("%s/api/oidc/authorize", baseURL),
"token_endpoint": fmt.Sprintf("%s/api/oidc/token", baseURL),
"userinfo_endpoint": fmt.Sprintf("%s/api/oidc/userinfo", baseURL),
"jwks_uri": fmt.Sprintf("%s/api/oidc/jwks", baseURL),
"response_types_supported": []string{"code"},
"subject_types_supported": []string{"public"},
"id_token_signing_alg_values_supported": []string{"RS256"},
"scopes_supported": []string{"openid", "profile", "email"},
"token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported": []string{"client_secret_basic", "client_secret_post"},
"grant_types_supported": []string{"authorization_code"},
"code_challenge_methods_supported": []string{"S256", "plain"},
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, discovery)
}
// authorizeHandler handles the OIDC authorization endpoint.
// Implements the authorization code flow as specified in OAuth 2.0 RFC 6749.
// Validates client credentials, redirect URI, scopes, and response type.
// Supports PKCE (RFC 7636) for enhanced security.
// If the user is not authenticated, redirects to the login page with the
// authorization request parameters preserved for redirect after login.
// On success, generates an authorization code and redirects to the client's
// redirect URI with the code and state parameter.
func (controller *OIDCController) authorizeHandler(c *gin.Context) {
// Get query parameters
clientID := c.Query("client_id")
redirectURI := c.Query("redirect_uri")
responseType := c.Query("response_type")
scope := c.Query("scope")
state := c.Query("state")
nonce := c.Query("nonce")
codeChallenge := c.Query("code_challenge")
codeChallengeMethod := c.Query("code_challenge_method")
// Validate required parameters
// Return JSON error instead of redirecting since redirect_uri is not yet validated
if clientID == "" || redirectURI == "" || responseType == "" {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{
"error": "invalid_request",
"error_description": "Missing required parameters",
})
return
}
// Get client
// Return JSON error instead of redirecting since redirect_uri is not yet validated
client, err := controller.oidc.GetClient(clientID)
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{
"error": "invalid_client",
"error_description": "Client not found",
})
return
}
// Validate redirect URI
// After this point, redirect_uri is validated and we can safely redirect
if !controller.oidc.ValidateRedirectURI(client, redirectURI) {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{
"error": "invalid_request",
"error_description": "Invalid redirect_uri",
})
return
}
// Validate response type
if !controller.oidc.ValidateResponseType(client, responseType) {
controller.redirectError(c, redirectURI, state, "unsupported_response_type", "Unsupported response_type")
return
}
// Validate scopes
scopes, err := controller.oidc.ValidateScope(client, scope)
if err != nil {
controller.redirectError(c, redirectURI, state, "invalid_scope", "Invalid scope")
return
}
// Check if user is authenticated
userContext, err := utils.GetContext(c)
if err != nil || !userContext.IsLoggedIn {
// User not authenticated, redirect to login
// Build the full authorize URL to redirect back to after login
authorizeURL := fmt.Sprintf("%s%s", controller.config.AppURL, c.Request.URL.Path)
if c.Request.URL.RawQuery != "" {
authorizeURL = fmt.Sprintf("%s?%s", authorizeURL, c.Request.URL.RawQuery)
}
loginURL := fmt.Sprintf("%s/login?redirect_uri=%s&client_id=%s&response_type=%s&scope=%s&state=%s&nonce=%s&code_challenge=%s&code_challenge_method=%s",
controller.config.AppURL,
url.QueryEscape(authorizeURL),
url.QueryEscape(clientID),
url.QueryEscape(responseType),
url.QueryEscape(scope),
url.QueryEscape(state),
url.QueryEscape(nonce),
url.QueryEscape(codeChallenge),
url.QueryEscape(codeChallengeMethod))
c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, loginURL)
return
}
// Check for TOTP pending
if userContext.TotpPending {
controller.redirectError(c, redirectURI, state, "access_denied", "TOTP verification required")
return
}
// Generate authorization code (including PKCE challenge if provided)
authCode, err := controller.oidc.GenerateAuthorizationCode(&userContext, clientID, redirectURI, scopes, nonce, codeChallenge, codeChallengeMethod)
if err != nil {
log.Error().Err(err).Msg("Failed to generate authorization code")
controller.redirectError(c, redirectURI, state, "server_error", "Internal server error")
return
}
// Build redirect URL with authorization code
redirectURL, err := url.Parse(redirectURI)
if err != nil {
controller.redirectError(c, redirectURI, state, "invalid_request", "Invalid redirect_uri")
return
}
query := redirectURL.Query()
query.Set("code", authCode)
if state != "" {
query.Set("state", state)
}
redirectURL.RawQuery = query.Encode()
c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, redirectURL.String())
}
// tokenHandler handles the OIDC token endpoint.
// Exchanges an authorization code for access and ID tokens.
// Validates the authorization code, client credentials, redirect URI, and PKCE verifier.
// Returns an access token and optionally an ID token (if openid scope is present).
// Implements the authorization code grant type as specified in OAuth 2.0 RFC 6749.
func (controller *OIDCController) tokenHandler(c *gin.Context) {
// Get grant type
grantType := c.PostForm("grant_type")
if grantType == "" {
grantType = c.Query("grant_type")
}
if grantType != "authorization_code" {
controller.tokenError(c, "unsupported_grant_type", "Only authorization_code grant type is supported")
return
}
// Get authorization code
code := c.PostForm("code")
if code == "" {
code = c.Query("code")
}
if code == "" {
controller.tokenError(c, "invalid_request", "Missing authorization code")
return
}
// Get client credentials
clientID, clientSecret, err := controller.getClientCredentials(c)
if err != nil {
controller.tokenError(c, "invalid_client", "Invalid client credentials")
return
}
// Get client
client, err := controller.oidc.GetClient(clientID)
if err != nil {
controller.tokenError(c, "invalid_client", "Client not found")
return
}
// Verify client secret
if !controller.oidc.VerifyClientSecret(client, clientSecret) {
controller.tokenError(c, "invalid_client", "Invalid client secret")
return
}
// Get redirect URI
redirectURI := c.PostForm("redirect_uri")
if redirectURI == "" {
redirectURI = c.Query("redirect_uri")
}
// Validate redirect URI
if !controller.oidc.ValidateRedirectURI(client, redirectURI) {
controller.tokenError(c, "invalid_request", "Invalid redirect_uri")
return
}
// Get code_verifier for PKCE validation
codeVerifier := c.PostForm("code_verifier")
if codeVerifier == "" {
codeVerifier = c.Query("code_verifier")
}
// Validate authorization code
userContext, scopes, nonce, codeChallenge, codeChallengeMethod, err := controller.oidc.ValidateAuthorizationCode(code, clientID, redirectURI)
if err != nil {
log.Error().Err(err).Msg("Failed to validate authorization code")
controller.tokenError(c, "invalid_grant", "Invalid or expired authorization code")
return
}
// Validate PKCE if code challenge was provided
if codeChallenge != "" {
if err := controller.oidc.ValidatePKCE(codeChallenge, codeChallengeMethod, codeVerifier); err != nil {
log.Error().Err(err).Msg("PKCE validation failed")
controller.tokenError(c, "invalid_grant", "Invalid code_verifier")
return
}
}
// Generate tokens
accessToken, err := controller.oidc.GenerateAccessToken(userContext, clientID, scopes)
if err != nil {
log.Error().Err(err).Msg("Failed to generate access token")
controller.tokenError(c, "server_error", "Internal server error")
return
}
// Generate ID token if openid scope is present
var idToken string
hasOpenID := false
for _, scope := range scopes {
if scope == "openid" {
hasOpenID = true
break
}
}
if hasOpenID {
idToken, err = controller.oidc.GenerateIDToken(userContext, clientID, nonce)
if err != nil {
log.Error().Err(err).Msg("Failed to generate ID token")
controller.tokenError(c, "server_error", "Internal server error")
return
}
}
// Return token response
response := map[string]interface{}{
"access_token": accessToken,
"token_type": "Bearer",
"expires_in": controller.oidc.GetAccessTokenExpiry(),
"scope": strings.Join(scopes, " "),
}
if idToken != "" {
response["id_token"] = idToken
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, response)
}
// userinfoHandler handles the OIDC UserInfo endpoint.
// Returns user information claims for the authenticated user based on the
// provided access token. Validates the access token signature, issuer, and expiration.
// Returns standard OIDC claims: sub, email, name, and preferred_username.
func (controller *OIDCController) userinfoHandler(c *gin.Context) {
// Get access token from Authorization header or query parameter
accessToken := controller.getAccessToken(c)
if accessToken == "" {
c.JSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{
"error": "invalid_token",
"error_description": "Missing access token",
})
return
}
// Get optional client_id from request for audience validation
clientID := c.Query("client_id")
if clientID == "" {
clientID = c.PostForm("client_id")
}
// Validate and parse access token with audience validation
userContext, err := controller.oidc.ValidateAccessTokenForClient(accessToken, clientID)
if err != nil {
log.Error().Err(err).Msg("Failed to validate access token")
c.JSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{
"error": "invalid_token",
"error_description": "Invalid or expired access token",
})
return
}
// Return user info
userInfo := map[string]interface{}{
"sub": userContext.Username,
"email": userContext.Email,
"name": userContext.Name,
"preferred_username": userContext.Username,
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, userInfo)
}
// jwksHandler handles the JSON Web Key Set (JWKS) endpoint.
// Returns the public keys used to verify ID tokens and access tokens.
// The keys are in JWK format as specified in RFC 7517.
func (controller *OIDCController) jwksHandler(c *gin.Context) {
jwks, err := controller.oidc.GetJWKS()
if err != nil {
log.Error().Err(err).Msg("Failed to get JWKS")
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{
"error": "server_error",
})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, jwks)
}
// Helper functions
// redirectError redirects the user to the redirect URI with an error response.
// Includes the error code, error description, and state parameter (if provided).
// If the redirect URI is invalid or empty, returns a JSON error response instead.
func (controller *OIDCController) redirectError(c *gin.Context, redirectURI string, state string, errorCode string, errorDescription string) {
if redirectURI == "" {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{
"error": errorCode,
"error_description": errorDescription,
})
return
}
redirectURL, err := url.Parse(redirectURI)
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{
"error": errorCode,
"error_description": errorDescription,
})
return
}
query := redirectURL.Query()
query.Set("error", errorCode)
query.Set("error_description", errorDescription)
if state != "" {
query.Set("state", state)
}
redirectURL.RawQuery = query.Encode()
c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, redirectURL.String())
}
// tokenError returns a JSON error response for token endpoint errors.
// Uses the standard OAuth 2.0 error format with error and error_description fields.
func (controller *OIDCController) tokenError(c *gin.Context, errorCode string, errorDescription string) {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{
"error": errorCode,
"error_description": errorDescription,
})
}
// getClientCredentials extracts client credentials from the request.
// Supports client_secret_basic (HTTP Basic Authentication) and
// client_secret_post (POST form parameters) as specified in the discovery document.
// Does not accept credentials via query parameters for security reasons
// (they may be logged in access logs, browser history, or referrer headers).
// Returns the client ID, client secret, and an error if credentials are not found.
func (controller *OIDCController) getClientCredentials(c *gin.Context) (string, string, error) {
// Try Basic Auth first (client_secret_basic)
authHeader := c.GetHeader("Authorization")
if strings.HasPrefix(authHeader, "Basic ") {
encoded := strings.TrimPrefix(authHeader, "Basic ")
decoded, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(encoded)
if err == nil {
parts := strings.SplitN(string(decoded), ":", 2)
if len(parts) == 2 {
return parts[0], parts[1], nil
}
}
}
// Try POST form parameters (client_secret_post)
clientID := c.PostForm("client_id")
clientSecret := c.PostForm("client_secret")
if clientID != "" && clientSecret != "" {
return clientID, clientSecret, nil
}
// Do not accept credentials via query parameters as they are logged
// in access logs, browser history, and referrer headers
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("client credentials not found")
}
// getAccessToken extracts the access token from the request.
// Checks the Authorization header (Bearer token) first, then falls back to
// the access_token query parameter.
// Returns an empty string if no access token is found.
func (controller *OIDCController) getAccessToken(c *gin.Context) string {
// Try Authorization header
authHeader := c.GetHeader("Authorization")
if strings.HasPrefix(authHeader, "Bearer ") {
return strings.TrimPrefix(authHeader, "Bearer ")
}
// Try query parameter
return c.Query("access_token")
}
// validateAccessToken validates an access token and extracts user context.
// Verifies the JWT signature using the OIDC service's public key, checks the
// issuer, and validates expiration. Returns the user context if valid, or an
// error if validation fails.
func (controller *OIDCController) validateAccessToken(accessToken string) (*config.UserContext, error) {
// Validate the JWT token using the OIDC service's public key
// This properly verifies the signature, issuer, and expiration
// Note: This method does not validate audience - use ValidateAccessTokenForClient for that
return controller.oidc.ValidateAccessToken(accessToken)
}

View File

@@ -239,6 +239,7 @@ func (controller *ProxyController) proxyHandler(c *gin.Context) {
c.Header("Remote-Name", utils.SanitizeHeader(userContext.Name))
c.Header("Remote-Email", utils.SanitizeHeader(userContext.Email))
c.Header("Remote-Groups", utils.SanitizeHeader(userContext.OAuthGroups))
c.Header("Remote-Sub", utils.SanitizeHeader(userContext.OAuthSub))
controller.setHeaders(c, acls)

View File

@@ -99,6 +99,7 @@ func (m *ContextMiddleware) Middleware() gin.HandlerFunc {
Provider: cookie.Provider,
OAuthGroups: cookie.OAuthGroups,
OAuthName: cookie.OAuthName,
OAuthSub: cookie.OAuthSub,
IsLoggedIn: true,
OAuth: true,
})

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
package model
type OIDCAuthorizationCode struct {
Code string `gorm:"column:code;primaryKey"`
ClientID string `gorm:"column:client_id;not null"`
RedirectURI string `gorm:"column:redirect_uri;not null"`
Used bool `gorm:"column:used;default:false"`
ExpiresAt int64 `gorm:"column:expires_at;not null"`
CreatedAt int64 `gorm:"column:created_at;not null"`
}
func (OIDCAuthorizationCode) TableName() string {
return "oidc_authorization_codes"
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
package model
type OIDCClient struct {
ClientID string `gorm:"column:client_id;primaryKey"`
ClientSecret string `gorm:"column:client_secret"`
ClientName string `gorm:"column:client_name"`
RedirectURIs string `gorm:"column:redirect_uris"` // JSON array
GrantTypes string `gorm:"column:grant_types"` // JSON array
ResponseTypes string `gorm:"column:response_types"` // JSON array
Scopes string `gorm:"column:scopes"` // JSON array
CreatedAt int64 `gorm:"column:created_at"`
UpdatedAt int64 `gorm:"column:updated_at"`
}
func (OIDCClient) TableName() string {
return "oidc_clients"
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
package model
type OIDCKey struct {
ID int `gorm:"column:id;primaryKey;autoIncrement"`
PrivateKey string `gorm:"column:private_key;not null"`
CreatedAt int64 `gorm:"column:created_at"`
UpdatedAt int64 `gorm:"column:updated_at"`
}
func (OIDCKey) TableName() string {
return "oidc_keys"
}

View File

@@ -10,4 +10,5 @@ type Session struct {
OAuthGroups string `gorm:"column:oauth_groups"`
Expiry int64 `gorm:"column:expiry"`
OAuthName string `gorm:"column:oauth_name"`
OAuthSub string `gorm:"column:oauth_sub"`
}

View File

@@ -213,6 +213,7 @@ func (auth *AuthService) CreateSessionCookie(c *gin.Context, data *config.Sessio
OAuthGroups: data.OAuthGroups,
Expiry: time.Now().Add(time.Duration(expiry) * time.Second).Unix(),
OAuthName: data.OAuthName,
OAuthSub: data.OAuthSub,
}
err = gorm.G[model.Session](auth.database).Create(c, &session)
@@ -314,6 +315,7 @@ func (auth *AuthService) GetSessionCookie(c *gin.Context) (config.SessionCookie,
TotpPending: session.TOTPPending,
OAuthGroups: session.OAuthGroups,
OAuthName: session.OAuthName,
OAuthSub: session.OAuthSub,
}, nil
}

View File

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"strconv"
"time"
"github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth/internal/config"
@@ -27,6 +28,7 @@ type GithubEmailResponse []struct {
type GithubUserInfoResponse struct {
Login string `json:"login"`
Name string `json:"name"`
ID int `json:"id"`
}
type GithubOAuthService struct {
@@ -172,6 +174,7 @@ func (github *GithubOAuthService) Userinfo() (config.Claims, error) {
user.PreferredUsername = userInfo.Login
user.Name = userInfo.Name
user.Sub = strconv.Itoa(userInfo.ID)
return user, nil
}

View File

@@ -17,12 +17,7 @@ import (
"golang.org/x/oauth2/endpoints"
)
var GoogleOAuthScopes = []string{"https://www.googleapis.com/auth/userinfo.email", "https://www.googleapis.com/auth/userinfo.profile"}
type GoogleUserInfoResponse struct {
Email string `json:"email"`
Name string `json:"name"`
}
var GoogleOAuthScopes = []string{"openid", "email", "profile"}
type GoogleOAuthService struct {
config oauth2.Config
@@ -91,7 +86,7 @@ func (google *GoogleOAuthService) Userinfo() (config.Claims, error) {
client := google.config.Client(google.context, google.token)
res, err := client.Get("https://www.googleapis.com/userinfo/v2/me")
res, err := client.Get("https://openidconnect.googleapis.com/v1/userinfo")
if err != nil {
return config.Claims{}, err
}
@@ -106,16 +101,12 @@ func (google *GoogleOAuthService) Userinfo() (config.Claims, error) {
return config.Claims{}, err
}
var userInfo GoogleUserInfoResponse
err = json.Unmarshal(body, &userInfo)
err = json.Unmarshal(body, &user)
if err != nil {
return config.Claims{}, err
}
user.PreferredUsername = strings.Split(userInfo.Email, "@")[0]
user.Name = userInfo.Name
user.Email = userInfo.Email
user.PreferredUsername = strings.SplitN(user.Email, "@", 2)[0]
return user, nil
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,822 @@
package service
import (
"crypto/aes"
"crypto/cipher"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/rsa"
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"encoding/pem"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"math/big"
"os"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth/internal/config"
"github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth/internal/model"
"github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth/internal/utils"
"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/rs/zerolog/log"
"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"
"golang.org/x/crypto/hkdf"
"gorm.io/gorm"
)
type OIDCServiceConfig struct {
AppURL string
Issuer string
AccessTokenExpiry int
IDTokenExpiry int
Database *gorm.DB
}
type OIDCService struct {
config OIDCServiceConfig
privateKey *rsa.PrivateKey
publicKey *rsa.PublicKey
masterKey []byte // Master key for encrypting private keys (optional)
}
func NewOIDCService(config OIDCServiceConfig) *OIDCService {
return &OIDCService{
config: config,
}
}
// encryptPrivateKey encrypts a private key PEM string using AES-GCM
func (oidc *OIDCService) encryptPrivateKey(plaintext string) (string, error) {
if len(oidc.masterKey) == 0 {
// No encryption key set, return plaintext
return plaintext, nil
}
// Derive AES-256 key from master key using HKDF
hkdfReader := hkdf.New(sha256.New, oidc.masterKey, nil, []byte("oidc-aes-256-key-v1"))
key := make([]byte, 32) // AES-256 requires 32 bytes
if _, err := io.ReadFull(hkdfReader, key); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to derive encryption key: %w", err)
}
block, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to create cipher: %w", err)
}
gcm, err := cipher.NewGCM(block)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to create GCM: %w", err)
}
nonce := make([]byte, gcm.NonceSize())
if _, err := rand.Read(nonce); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to generate nonce: %w", err)
}
ciphertext := gcm.Seal(nonce, nonce, []byte(plaintext), nil)
// Encode as base64 for storage
return base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(ciphertext), nil
}
// decryptPrivateKey decrypts an encrypted private key PEM string
func (oidc *OIDCService) decryptPrivateKey(encrypted string) (string, error) {
if len(oidc.masterKey) == 0 {
// No encryption key set, assume plaintext
return encrypted, nil
}
// Try to decode as base64 (encrypted) first
ciphertext, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(encrypted)
if err != nil {
// Not base64, assume it's plaintext (backward compatibility)
return encrypted, nil
}
// Derive AES-256 key from master key using HKDF
hkdfReader := hkdf.New(sha256.New, oidc.masterKey, nil, []byte("oidc-aes-256-key-v1"))
key := make([]byte, 32) // AES-256 requires 32 bytes
if _, err := io.ReadFull(hkdfReader, key); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to derive decryption key: %w", err)
}
block, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to create cipher: %w", err)
}
gcm, err := cipher.NewGCM(block)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to create GCM: %w", err)
}
nonceSize := gcm.NonceSize()
if len(ciphertext) < nonceSize {
// Too short to be encrypted, assume plaintext
return encrypted, nil
}
nonce, ciphertext := ciphertext[:nonceSize], ciphertext[nonceSize:]
plaintext, err := gcm.Open(nil, nonce, ciphertext, nil)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to decrypt private key: %w", err)
}
return string(plaintext), nil
}
func (oidc *OIDCService) Init() error {
// Load master key from environment (optional)
masterKeyEnv := os.Getenv("OIDC_RSA_MASTER_KEY")
if masterKeyEnv != "" {
oidc.masterKey = []byte(masterKeyEnv)
if len(oidc.masterKey) < 32 {
log.Warn().Msg("OIDC_RSA_MASTER_KEY is shorter than 32 bytes, consider using a longer key for better security")
}
log.Info().Msg("RSA private key encryption enabled (using OIDC_RSA_MASTER_KEY)")
} else {
log.Info().Msg("RSA private key encryption disabled (OIDC_RSA_MASTER_KEY not set)")
}
// Check if multiple keys exist (for warning)
var keyCount int64
if err := oidc.config.Database.Model(&model.OIDCKey{}).Count(&keyCount).Error; err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to count RSA keys: %w", err)
}
if keyCount > 1 {
log.Warn().Int64("count", keyCount).Msg("Multiple RSA keys detected in database, loading most recently created key. Consider cleaning up older keys.")
}
// Try to load existing key from database (most recently created)
var keyRecord model.OIDCKey
err := oidc.config.Database.Order("created_at DESC").First(&keyRecord).Error
if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound) {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to query for existing RSA key: %w", err)
}
var privateKey *rsa.PrivateKey
if err == nil && keyRecord.PrivateKey != "" {
// Decrypt private key if encrypted
privateKeyPEM, err := oidc.decryptPrivateKey(keyRecord.PrivateKey)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to decrypt private key: %w", err)
}
// Load existing key
block, _ := pem.Decode([]byte(privateKeyPEM))
if block == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to decode PEM block from stored key")
}
parsedKey, err := x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(block.Bytes)
if err != nil {
// Try PKCS8 format as fallback
key, err := x509.ParsePKCS8PrivateKey(block.Bytes)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to parse stored private key: %w", err)
}
var ok bool
privateKey, ok = key.(*rsa.PrivateKey)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("stored key is not an RSA private key")
}
} else {
privateKey = parsedKey
}
oidc.privateKey = privateKey
oidc.publicKey = &privateKey.PublicKey
log.Info().Msg("OIDC service initialized with existing RSA key pair from database")
return nil
}
// No existing key found, generate new one
privateKey, err = rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to generate RSA key: %w", err)
}
// Encode private key to PEM format
privateKeyBytes := x509.MarshalPKCS1PrivateKey(privateKey)
privateKeyPEM := pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{
Type: "RSA PRIVATE KEY",
Bytes: privateKeyBytes,
})
// Encrypt private key before storing
encryptedPrivateKey, err := oidc.encryptPrivateKey(string(privateKeyPEM))
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to encrypt private key: %w", err)
}
// Save to database
now := time.Now().Unix()
keyRecord = model.OIDCKey{
PrivateKey: encryptedPrivateKey,
CreatedAt: now,
UpdatedAt: now,
}
if err := oidc.config.Database.Create(&keyRecord).Error; err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to save RSA key to database: %w", err)
}
oidc.privateKey = privateKey
oidc.publicKey = &privateKey.PublicKey
log.Info().Msg("OIDC service initialized with new RSA key pair (saved to database)")
return nil
}
func (oidc *OIDCService) GetClient(clientID string) (*model.OIDCClient, error) {
var client model.OIDCClient
err := oidc.config.Database.Where("client_id = ?", clientID).First(&client).Error
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound) {
return nil, errors.New("client not found")
}
return nil, err
}
return &client, nil
}
func (oidc *OIDCService) VerifyClientSecret(client *model.OIDCClient, secret string) bool {
// Use bcrypt for constant-time comparison to prevent timing attacks
err := bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword([]byte(client.ClientSecret), []byte(secret))
if err != nil {
log.Debug().Err(err).Str("client_id", client.ClientID).Msg("Client secret verification failed")
return false
}
return true
}
func (oidc *OIDCService) ValidateRedirectURI(client *model.OIDCClient, redirectURI string) bool {
var redirectURIs []string
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(client.RedirectURIs), &redirectURIs); err != nil {
log.Error().Err(err).Msg("Failed to unmarshal redirect URIs")
return false
}
for _, uri := range redirectURIs {
if uri == redirectURI {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func (oidc *OIDCService) ValidateGrantType(client *model.OIDCClient, grantType string) bool {
var grantTypes []string
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(client.GrantTypes), &grantTypes); err != nil {
log.Error().Err(err).Msg("Failed to unmarshal grant types")
return false
}
for _, gt := range grantTypes {
if gt == grantType {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func (oidc *OIDCService) ValidateResponseType(client *model.OIDCClient, responseType string) bool {
var responseTypes []string
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(client.ResponseTypes), &responseTypes); err != nil {
log.Error().Err(err).Msg("Failed to unmarshal response types")
return false
}
for _, rt := range responseTypes {
if rt == responseType {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func (oidc *OIDCService) ValidateScope(client *model.OIDCClient, requestedScopes string) ([]string, error) {
var allowedScopes []string
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(client.Scopes), &allowedScopes); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to unmarshal scopes: %w", err)
}
requestedScopesList := []string{}
if requestedScopes != "" {
requestedScopesList = splitScopes(requestedScopes)
}
validScopes := []string{}
for _, scope := range requestedScopesList {
for _, allowed := range allowedScopes {
if scope == allowed {
validScopes = append(validScopes, scope)
break
}
}
}
return validScopes, nil
}
func (oidc *OIDCService) GenerateAuthorizationCode(userContext *config.UserContext, clientID string, redirectURI string, scopes []string, nonce string, codeChallenge string, codeChallengeMethod string) (string, error) {
code := uuid.New().String()
now := time.Now()
expiresAt := now.Add(10 * time.Minute).Unix()
// Store authorization code in database for replay protection
authCodeRecord := model.OIDCAuthorizationCode{
Code: code,
ClientID: clientID,
RedirectURI: redirectURI,
Used: false,
ExpiresAt: expiresAt,
CreatedAt: now.Unix(),
}
if err := oidc.config.Database.Create(&authCodeRecord).Error; err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to store authorization code: %w", err)
}
// Encode as JWT for stateless operation (but code is tracked in DB)
claims := jwt.MapClaims{
"code": code,
"username": userContext.Username,
"email": userContext.Email,
"name": userContext.Name,
"provider": userContext.Provider,
"client_id": clientID,
"redirect_uri": redirectURI,
"scopes": scopes,
"exp": expiresAt,
"iat": now.Unix(),
}
if nonce != "" {
claims["nonce"] = nonce
}
// Store PKCE challenge if provided
if codeChallenge != "" {
claims["code_challenge"] = codeChallenge
if codeChallengeMethod != "" {
claims["code_challenge_method"] = codeChallengeMethod
} else {
// Default to plain if method not specified
claims["code_challenge_method"] = "plain"
}
}
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodRS256, claims)
codeToken, err := token.SignedString(oidc.privateKey)
if err != nil {
// Clean up the database record if JWT signing fails
oidc.config.Database.Delete(&authCodeRecord)
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to sign authorization code: %w", err)
}
return codeToken, nil
}
func (oidc *OIDCService) ValidateAuthorizationCode(codeToken string, clientID string, redirectURI string) (*config.UserContext, []string, string, string, string, error) {
token, err := jwt.Parse(codeToken, func(token *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) {
if _, ok := token.Method.(*jwt.SigningMethodRSA); !ok {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected signing method: %v", token.Header["alg"])
}
return oidc.publicKey, nil
})
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, "", "", "", fmt.Errorf("failed to parse authorization code: %w", err)
}
if !token.Valid {
return nil, nil, "", "", "", errors.New("invalid authorization code")
}
claims, ok := token.Claims.(jwt.MapClaims)
if !ok {
return nil, nil, "", "", "", errors.New("invalid token claims")
}
// Extract code from JWT for database lookup
code, ok := claims["code"].(string)
if !ok || code == "" {
return nil, nil, "", "", "", errors.New("missing code in authorization code token")
}
// Check database for replay protection - verify code exists and hasn't been used
var authCodeRecord model.OIDCAuthorizationCode
err = oidc.config.Database.Where("code = ?", code).First(&authCodeRecord).Error
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound) {
return nil, nil, "", "", "", errors.New("authorization code not found")
}
return nil, nil, "", "", "", fmt.Errorf("failed to query authorization code: %w", err)
}
// Check if code has already been used (replay attack protection)
if authCodeRecord.Used {
return nil, nil, "", "", "", errors.New("authorization code has already been used")
}
// Check expiration
if time.Now().Unix() > authCodeRecord.ExpiresAt {
return nil, nil, "", "", "", errors.New("authorization code expired")
}
// Verify client_id and redirect_uri match
if claims["client_id"] != clientID {
return nil, nil, "", "", "", errors.New("client_id mismatch")
}
if claims["redirect_uri"] != redirectURI {
return nil, nil, "", "", "", errors.New("redirect_uri mismatch")
}
// Verify database record matches request parameters
if authCodeRecord.ClientID != clientID {
return nil, nil, "", "", "", errors.New("client_id mismatch")
}
if authCodeRecord.RedirectURI != redirectURI {
return nil, nil, "", "", "", errors.New("redirect_uri mismatch")
}
// Mark code as used to prevent replay attacks
authCodeRecord.Used = true
if err := oidc.config.Database.Save(&authCodeRecord).Error; err != nil {
return nil, nil, "", "", "", fmt.Errorf("failed to mark authorization code as used: %w", err)
}
userContext := &config.UserContext{
Username: getStringClaim(claims, "username"),
Email: getStringClaim(claims, "email"),
Name: getStringClaim(claims, "name"),
Provider: getStringClaim(claims, "provider"),
IsLoggedIn: true,
}
scopes := []string{}
if scopesInterface, ok := claims["scopes"].([]interface{}); ok {
for _, s := range scopesInterface {
if scope, ok := s.(string); ok {
scopes = append(scopes, scope)
}
}
}
nonce := getStringClaim(claims, "nonce")
codeChallenge := getStringClaim(claims, "code_challenge")
codeChallengeMethod := getStringClaim(claims, "code_challenge_method")
return userContext, scopes, nonce, codeChallenge, codeChallengeMethod, nil
}
func (oidc *OIDCService) ValidatePKCE(codeChallenge string, codeChallengeMethod string, codeVerifier string) error {
if codeChallenge == "" {
// PKCE not used, validation passes
return nil
}
if codeVerifier == "" {
return errors.New("code_verifier required when code_challenge is present")
}
switch codeChallengeMethod {
case "S256":
// Compute SHA256 hash of code_verifier
hash := sha256.Sum256([]byte(codeVerifier))
// Base64URL encode (without padding)
computedChallenge := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(hash[:])
if computedChallenge != codeChallenge {
return errors.New("code_verifier does not match code_challenge")
}
case "plain":
// Direct comparison
if codeVerifier != codeChallenge {
return errors.New("code_verifier does not match code_challenge")
}
default:
return fmt.Errorf("unsupported code_challenge_method: %s", codeChallengeMethod)
}
return nil
}
func (oidc *OIDCService) GenerateAccessToken(userContext *config.UserContext, clientID string, scopes []string) (string, error) {
expiry := oidc.config.AccessTokenExpiry
if expiry <= 0 {
expiry = 3600 // Default 1 hour
}
now := time.Now()
claims := jwt.MapClaims{
"sub": userContext.Username,
"iss": oidc.config.Issuer,
"aud": clientID,
"exp": now.Add(time.Duration(expiry) * time.Second).Unix(),
"iat": now.Unix(),
"scope": joinScopes(scopes),
"client_id": clientID,
}
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodRS256, claims)
accessToken, err := token.SignedString(oidc.privateKey)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to sign access token: %w", err)
}
return accessToken, nil
}
func (oidc *OIDCService) ValidateAccessToken(accessToken string) (*config.UserContext, error) {
return oidc.ValidateAccessTokenForClient(accessToken, "")
}
// ValidateAccessTokenForClient validates an access token and optionally checks the audience claim.
// If expectedClientID is provided, validates that the token's audience matches the expected client ID.
// This prevents tokens issued for one client from being used by another client.
func (oidc *OIDCService) ValidateAccessTokenForClient(accessToken string, expectedClientID string) (*config.UserContext, error) {
token, err := jwt.Parse(accessToken, func(token *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) {
if _, ok := token.Method.(*jwt.SigningMethodRSA); !ok {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected signing method: %v", token.Header["alg"])
}
return oidc.publicKey, nil
})
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse access token: %w", err)
}
if !token.Valid {
return nil, errors.New("invalid access token")
}
claims, ok := token.Claims.(jwt.MapClaims)
if !ok {
return nil, errors.New("invalid token claims")
}
// Verify issuer
iss, ok := claims["iss"].(string)
if !ok || iss != oidc.config.Issuer {
return nil, errors.New("invalid issuer")
}
// Verify audience if expected client ID is provided
if expectedClientID != "" {
aud, ok := claims["aud"].(string)
if !ok || aud != expectedClientID {
return nil, errors.New("invalid audience")
}
}
// Check expiration
exp, ok := claims["exp"].(float64)
if !ok || time.Now().Unix() > int64(exp) {
return nil, errors.New("access token expired")
}
// Extract user info from claims
username, ok := claims["sub"].(string)
if !ok || username == "" {
return nil, errors.New("missing sub claim")
}
// Extract email and name if available
email, _ := claims["email"].(string)
name, _ := claims["name"].(string)
// Create user context
userContext := &config.UserContext{
Username: username,
Email: email,
Name: name,
IsLoggedIn: true,
}
return userContext, nil
}
func (oidc *OIDCService) GenerateIDToken(userContext *config.UserContext, clientID string, nonce string) (string, error) {
expiry := oidc.config.IDTokenExpiry
if expiry <= 0 {
expiry = 3600 // Default 1 hour
}
now := time.Now()
claims := jwt.MapClaims{
"sub": userContext.Username,
"iss": oidc.config.Issuer,
"aud": clientID,
"exp": now.Add(time.Duration(expiry) * time.Second).Unix(),
"iat": now.Unix(),
"auth_time": now.Unix(),
"email": userContext.Email,
"name": userContext.Name,
"preferred_username": userContext.Username,
}
if nonce != "" {
claims["nonce"] = nonce
}
token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodRS256, claims)
idToken, err := token.SignedString(oidc.privateKey)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to sign ID token: %w", err)
}
return idToken, nil
}
func (oidc *OIDCService) GetJWKS() (map[string]interface{}, error) {
// Extract modulus and exponent from public key
n := oidc.publicKey.N
e := oidc.publicKey.E
nBytes := n.Bytes()
// Use minimal-octet encoding for exponent per RFC 7517
eBytes := big.NewInt(int64(e)).Bytes()
jwk := map[string]interface{}{
"kty": "RSA",
"use": "sig",
"kid": "default",
"n": base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(nBytes),
"e": base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(eBytes),
"alg": "RS256",
}
return map[string]interface{}{
"keys": []interface{}{jwk},
}, nil
}
func (oidc *OIDCService) GetIssuer() string {
return oidc.config.Issuer
}
func (oidc *OIDCService) GetAccessTokenExpiry() int {
if oidc.config.AccessTokenExpiry <= 0 {
return 3600 // Default 1 hour
}
return oidc.config.AccessTokenExpiry
}
func (oidc *OIDCService) SyncClientsFromConfig(clients map[string]config.OIDCClientConfig) error {
for clientID, clientConfig := range clients {
// Get client secret from config or file (similar to OAuth providers)
clientSecret := utils.GetSecret(clientConfig.ClientSecret, clientConfig.ClientSecretFile)
if clientSecret == "" {
log.Warn().Str("client_id", clientID).Msg("Client secret is empty, skipping client")
continue
}
// Set defaults
clientName := clientConfig.ClientName
if clientName == "" {
clientName = clientID
}
redirectURIs := clientConfig.RedirectURIs
if len(redirectURIs) == 0 {
log.Warn().Str("client_id", clientID).Msg("No redirect URIs configured for client")
continue
}
grantTypes := clientConfig.GrantTypes
if len(grantTypes) == 0 {
grantTypes = []string{"authorization_code"}
}
responseTypes := clientConfig.ResponseTypes
if len(responseTypes) == 0 {
responseTypes = []string{"code"}
}
scopes := clientConfig.Scopes
if len(scopes) == 0 {
scopes = []string{"openid", "profile", "email"}
}
// Serialize arrays to JSON
redirectURIsJSON, err := json.Marshal(redirectURIs)
if err != nil {
log.Error().Err(err).Str("client_id", clientID).Msg("Failed to marshal redirect URIs")
continue
}
grantTypesJSON, err := json.Marshal(grantTypes)
if err != nil {
log.Error().Err(err).Str("client_id", clientID).Msg("Failed to marshal grant types")
continue
}
responseTypesJSON, err := json.Marshal(responseTypes)
if err != nil {
log.Error().Err(err).Str("client_id", clientID).Msg("Failed to marshal response types")
continue
}
scopesJSON, err := json.Marshal(scopes)
if err != nil {
log.Error().Err(err).Str("client_id", clientID).Msg("Failed to marshal scopes")
continue
}
// Hash client secret with bcrypt before storing
hashedSecret, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte(clientSecret), bcrypt.DefaultCost)
if err != nil {
log.Error().Err(err).Str("client_id", clientID).Msg("Failed to hash client secret")
continue
}
now := time.Now().Unix()
// Check if client exists
var existingClient model.OIDCClient
err = oidc.config.Database.Where("client_id = ?", clientID).First(&existingClient).Error
client := model.OIDCClient{
ClientID: clientID,
ClientSecret: string(hashedSecret),
ClientName: clientName,
RedirectURIs: string(redirectURIsJSON),
GrantTypes: string(grantTypesJSON),
ResponseTypes: string(responseTypesJSON),
Scopes: string(scopesJSON),
UpdatedAt: now,
}
if errors.Is(err, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound) {
// Create new client
client.CreatedAt = now
if err := oidc.config.Database.Create(&client).Error; err != nil {
log.Error().Err(err).Str("client_id", clientID).Msg("Failed to create OIDC client")
continue
}
log.Info().Str("client_id", clientID).Str("client_name", clientName).Msg("Created OIDC client from config")
} else if err == nil {
// Update existing client
client.CreatedAt = existingClient.CreatedAt // Preserve original creation time
if err := oidc.config.Database.Where("client_id = ?", clientID).Updates(&client).Error; err != nil {
log.Error().Err(err).Str("client_id", clientID).Msg("Failed to update OIDC client")
continue
}
log.Info().Str("client_id", clientID).Str("client_name", clientName).Msg("Updated OIDC client from config")
} else {
log.Error().Err(err).Str("client_id", clientID).Msg("Failed to check existing OIDC client")
continue
}
}
return nil
}
// Helper functions
func splitScopes(scopes string) []string {
if scopes == "" {
return []string{}
}
parts := strings.Split(scopes, " ")
result := []string{}
for _, part := range parts {
trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(part)
if trimmed != "" {
result = append(result, trimmed)
}
}
return result
}
func joinScopes(scopes []string) string {
return strings.Join(scopes, " ")
}
func contains(slice []string, item string) bool {
for _, s := range slice {
if s == item {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func getStringClaim(claims jwt.MapClaims, key string) string {
if val, ok := claims[key].(string); ok {
return val
}
return ""
}

View File

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package utils
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"net"
"net/url"
"strings"
@@ -22,13 +23,13 @@ func GetCookieDomain(u string) (string, error) {
host := parsed.Hostname()
if netIP := net.ParseIP(host); netIP != nil {
return "", errors.New("IP addresses not allowed")
return "", fmt.Errorf("IP addresses not allowed for app url '%s' (got IP: %s)", u, host)
}
parts := strings.Split(host, ".")
if len(parts) < 3 {
return "", errors.New("invalid app url, must be at least second level domain")
return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid app url '%s', must be at least second level domain (got %d parts, need 3+)", u, len(parts))
}
domain := strings.Join(parts[1:], ".")
@@ -36,7 +37,7 @@ func GetCookieDomain(u string) (string, error) {
_, err = publicsuffix.DomainFromListWithOptions(publicsuffix.DefaultList, domain, nil)
if err != nil {
return "", errors.New("domain in public suffix list, cannot set cookies")
return "", fmt.Errorf("domain '%s' (from app url '%s') is in public suffix list, cannot set cookies", domain, u)
}
return domain, nil

View File

@@ -16,18 +16,25 @@ func (f *FileLoader) Load(args []string, cmd *cli.Command) (bool, error) {
return false, err
}
// I guess we are using traefik as the root name
configFileFlag := "traefik.experimental.configFile"
// Check for experimental config file flag (supports both traefik.* and direct format)
// Note: paerser converts flags to lowercase, so we check lowercase versions
configFilePath := ""
if val, ok := flags["traefik.experimental.configfile"]; ok {
configFilePath = val
} else if val, ok := flags["experimental.configfile"]; ok {
configFilePath = val
}
if _, ok := flags[configFileFlag]; !ok {
if configFilePath == "" {
return false, nil
}
log.Warn().Msg("Using experimental file config loader, this feature is experimental and may change or be removed in future releases")
log.Warn().Str("configFile", configFilePath).Msg("Using experimental file config loader, this feature is experimental and may change or be removed in future releases")
err = file.Decode(flags[configFileFlag], cmd.Configuration)
err = file.Decode(configFilePath, cmd.Configuration)
if err != nil {
log.Error().Err(err).Str("configFile", configFilePath).Msg("Failed to decode config file")
return false, err
}

14
validation/Dockerfile Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
FROM python:3.11-slim
WORKDIR /app
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir requests authlib
COPY oidc_whoami.py /app/oidc_whoami.py
RUN chmod +x /app/oidc_whoami.py
EXPOSE 8765
CMD ["python3", "/app/oidc_whoami.py"]

181
validation/README.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
# OIDC Validation Setup
This directory contains a docker-compose setup for testing tinyauth's OIDC provider functionality with a minimal test client.
## Setup
1. **Build the OIDC test client image:**
```bash
docker build -t oidc-whoami-test:latest .
```
2. **Start the services:**
```bash
docker compose up --build
```
## Services
### nginx
- **Purpose:** Reverse proxy for `auth.example.com` → tinyauth
- **Ports:** 80 (exposed to host)
- **Access:** http://auth.example.com/ (via nginx on port 80)
### dns
- **Purpose:** DNS server (dnsmasq) that resolves `auth.example.com` to the tinyauth container
- **Configuration:** Resolves `auth.example.com` to the `tinyauth` container IP (172.28.0.20) within the Docker network
- **Ports:** 53 (UDP/TCP) - not exposed to host (only for container-to-container communication)
### tinyauth
- **URL:** http://auth.example.com/ (via nginx)
- **Credentials:** `user` / `pass`
- **OIDC Discovery:** http://auth.example.com/api/.well-known/openid-configuration
- **OIDC Client ID:** `testclient`
- **OIDC Client Secret:** `test-secret-123`
- **Ports:** Not exposed to host (accessed via nginx on port 80)
### oidc-whoami
- **Callback URL:** http://localhost:8765/callback
- **Purpose:** Minimal OIDC test client that validates the OIDC flow
- **Ports:** 8765 (exposed to host)
## Quick Start
1. **Start all services:**
```bash
docker compose up --build -d
```
2. **Launch Chrome with host-resolver-rules:**
```bash
./launch-chrome-host.sh
```
Or manually:
```bash
google-chrome \
--host-resolver-rules="MAP auth.example.com 127.0.0.1" \
--disable-features=HttpsOnlyMode \
--unsafely-treat-insecure-origin-as-secure=http://auth.example.com \
--user-data-dir=/tmp/chrome-test-profile \
http://auth.example.com/
```
**Note:** The `--user-data-dir` flag uses a temporary profile to avoid HSTS (HTTP Strict Transport Security) issues that might force HTTPS redirects.
3. **Access tinyauth:** http://auth.example.com/
- Login with: `user` / `pass`
4. **Test OIDC flow:**
```bash
# Get authorization URL from oidc-whoami logs
docker compose logs oidc-whoami | grep "Authorization URL"
# Open that URL in Chrome (already configured with host-resolver-rules)
```
## Connecting from Chrome/Browser
Since the DNS server is only accessible within the Docker network, you have several options to access `auth.example.com` from your browser:
### Option 1: Use /etc/hosts (Simplest)
Add this line to your `/etc/hosts` file (or `C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts` on Windows):
```
127.0.0.1 auth.example.com
```
Then access: http://auth.example.com/
**To edit /etc/hosts on Linux/Mac:**
```bash
sudo nano /etc/hosts
# Add: 127.0.0.1 auth.example.com
```
**To edit hosts on Windows:**
1. Open Notepad as Administrator
2. Open `C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts`
3. Add: `127.0.0.1 auth.example.com`
### Option 2: Use Chrome's `--host-resolver-rules` (Chrome-specific, No System Changes)
Chrome has a command-line flag that lets you map hostnames directly, bypassing DNS entirely. This is perfect for testing without modifying system settings.
**To use it:**
1. **Make sure services are running:**
```bash
docker compose up -d
```
2. **Launch Chrome with the host resolver rule:**
**Linux:**
```bash
google-chrome --host-resolver-rules="MAP auth.example.com 127.0.0.1"
```
**Mac:**
```bash
/Applications/Google\ Chrome.app/Contents/MacOS/Google\ Chrome \
--host-resolver-rules="MAP auth.example.com 127.0.0.1"
```
**Windows:**
```cmd
"C:\Program Files\Google\ Chrome\Application\chrome.exe" --host-resolver-rules="MAP auth.example.com 127.0.0.1"
```
3. **Or modify Chrome's shortcut:**
- Right-click Chrome shortcut → Properties
- In "Target" field, append: ` --host-resolver-rules="MAP auth.example.com 127.0.0.1"`
- Click OK
4. **Access:** http://auth.example.com/
**Note:** This only affects Chrome, not other applications. The DNS server on port 5353 isn't needed for this approach.
### Option 3: Use System DNS (All Applications)
If you want to use the DNS server on port 5353 for all applications (not just Chrome), configure your system DNS:
**Linux (with systemd-resolved):**
```bash
# Configure systemd-resolved to use our DNS
sudo resolvectl dns lo 127.0.0.1:5353
```
**Linux (without systemd-resolved):**
```bash
# Edit /etc/resolv.conf
sudo nano /etc/resolv.conf
# Add: nameserver 127.0.0.1
# Note: This won't work with port 5353, you'd need port 53
```
**Note:** Most systems expect DNS on port 53. To use port 5353, you'd need a DNS proxy or configure Chrome specifically (see Option 2 above).
## Testing
1. Start the services with `docker compose up --build -d`
2. Launch Chrome: `./launch-chrome-host.sh` (or use `--host-resolver-rules` manually)
3. Navigate to: http://auth.example.com/
4. Login with `user` / `pass`
5. Test the OIDC flow by accessing the discovery endpoint: http://auth.example.com/api/.well-known/openid-configuration
## Configuration
The tinyauth configuration is in `config.yaml`:
- OIDC is enabled
- Single user: `user` with password `pass`
- OIDC client `testclient` is configured with redirect URI `http://localhost:8765/callback`
- App URL and OIDC issuer: `http://auth.example.com` (via nginx on port 80)
## Notes
- All containers are on a custom Docker network (`tinyauth-network`) with a DNS server for domain resolution
- The DNS server resolves `auth.example.com` to the tinyauth container within the network
- The redirect URI must match exactly what's configured in tinyauth
- Data is persisted in the `./data` directory
- The domain `auth.example.com` is used to satisfy cookie domain validation requirements (needs at least 3 domain parts and not in public suffix list)

36
validation/config.yaml Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
appUrl: "http://auth.example.com"
logLevel: "info"
databasePath: "/data/tinyauth.db"
auth:
users: "user:$2b$12$mWEdxub8KTTBLK/f7dloKOS4t3kIeLOpme5pMXci5.lXNPANjCT5u" # user:pass
secureCookie: false
sessionExpiry: 3600
loginTimeout: 300
loginMaxRetries: 3
oidc:
enabled: true
issuer: "http://auth.example.com"
accessTokenExpiry: 3600
idTokenExpiry: 3600
clients:
testclient:
clientSecret: "test-secret-123"
clientName: "OIDC Test Client"
redirectUris:
- "http://client.example.com/callback"
- "http://localhost:8765/callback"
- "http://127.0.0.1:8765/callback"
grantTypes:
- "authorization_code"
responseTypes:
- "code"
scopes:
- "openid"
- "profile"
- "email"
ui:
title: "Tinyauth OIDC Test"

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
version: '3.8'
services:
dns:
container_name: dns-server
image: strm/dnsmasq:latest
cap_add:
- NET_ADMIN
command:
- "--no-daemon"
- "--log-queries"
- "--no-resolv"
- "--server=8.8.8.8"
- "--server=8.8.4.4"
- "--address=/auth.example.com/172.28.0.2"
- "--address=/client.example.com/172.28.0.2"
# DNS port not exposed to host - only needed for container-to-container communication
# Chrome uses --host-resolver-rules instead
networks:
tinyauth-network:
ipv4_address: 172.28.0.10
nginx:
container_name: nginx-proxy
image: nginx:alpine
ports:
- "80:80"
volumes:
- ./nginx.conf:/etc/nginx/nginx.conf:ro
networks:
- tinyauth-network
# Use Docker's built-in DNS (127.0.0.11) for service name resolution
# Our custom DNS (172.28.0.10) is only used via resolver directive in nginx.conf
depends_on:
- tinyauth
- dns
- oidc-whoami
tinyauth:
container_name: tinyauth-oidc-test
build:
context: ..
dockerfile: Dockerfile
command: ["--experimental.configfile=/config/config.yaml"]
# Port not exposed to host - accessed via nginx
volumes:
- ./data:/data
- ./config.yaml:/config/config.yaml:ro
networks:
tinyauth-network:
ipv4_address: 172.28.0.20
depends_on:
- dns
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "tinyauth", "healthcheck"]
interval: 10s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
oidc-whoami:
container_name: oidc-whoami-test
build:
context: .
dockerfile: Dockerfile
environment:
- OIDC_ISSUER=http://auth.example.com
- CLIENT_ID=testclient
- CLIENT_SECRET=test-secret-123
# Port not exposed to host - accessed via nginx
depends_on:
- tinyauth
- dns
# Use Docker's built-in DNS first, then our custom DNS for custom domains
dns:
- 127.0.0.11
- 172.28.0.10
networks:
tinyauth-network:
ipv4_address: 172.28.0.30
# Note: Using custom network with DNS server to resolve auth.example.test
# The redirect URI must match what's configured in tinyauth (http://localhost:8765/callback)
# Using auth.example.test domain to satisfy cookie domain validation requirements (needs 3+ parts, not in public suffix list)
networks:
tinyauth-network:
driver: bridge
ipam:
config:
- subnet: 172.28.0.0/16

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#!/bin/bash
# Launch Chrome from host (not in container)
# This script should be run on your host machine
set -e
echo "Launching Chrome for OIDC test setup..."
# Detect Chrome
if command -v google-chrome &> /dev/null; then
CHROME_CMD="google-chrome"
elif command -v chromium-browser &> /dev/null; then
CHROME_CMD="chromium-browser"
elif command -v chromium &> /dev/null; then
CHROME_CMD="chromium"
elif [ -f "/Applications/Google Chrome.app/Contents/MacOS/Google Chrome" ]; then
CHROME_CMD="/Applications/Google Chrome.app/Contents/MacOS/Google Chrome"
else
echo "Error: Chrome not found. Please install Google Chrome or Chromium."
exit 1
fi
echo "Using: $CHROME_CMD"
echo "Opening: http://client.example.com/ (OIDC test client)"
echo ""
$CHROME_CMD \
--host-resolver-rules="MAP auth.example.com 127.0.0.1, MAP client.example.com 127.0.0.1" \
--disable-features=HttpsOnlyMode \
--unsafely-treat-insecure-origin-as-secure=http://auth.example.com,http://client.example.com \
--user-data-dir=/tmp/chrome-test-profile-$(date +%s) \
--new-window \
http://client.example.com/ \
> /dev/null 2>&1 &
echo "Chrome launched!"
echo "OIDC test client: http://client.example.com/"
echo "Tinyauth: http://auth.example.com/"

68
validation/launch-chrome.sh Executable file
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#!/bin/bash
set -e
echo "=========================================="
echo "Chrome Launcher for OIDC Test Setup"
echo "=========================================="
# Wait for nginx to be ready
echo "Waiting for nginx to be ready..."
for i in {1..30}; do
if curl -s http://127.0.0.1/ > /dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "✓ Nginx is ready"
break
fi
if [ $i -eq 30 ]; then
echo "✗ Nginx not ready after 30 seconds"
exit 1
fi
sleep 1
done
# Try to find Chrome on the host system
# Since we're in a container, we need to check common locations
CHROME_PATHS=(
"/usr/bin/google-chrome"
"/usr/bin/google-chrome-stable"
"/usr/bin/chromium-browser"
"/usr/bin/chromium"
"/Applications/Google Chrome.app/Contents/MacOS/Google Chrome"
)
CHROME_CMD=""
for path in "${CHROME_PATHS[@]}"; do
if [ -f "$path" ] || command -v "$(basename "$path")" &> /dev/null; then
CHROME_CMD="$(basename "$path")"
break
fi
done
if [ -z "$CHROME_CMD" ]; then
echo ""
echo "Chrome not found in container. This is expected."
echo "Please launch Chrome manually on your host with:"
echo ""
echo ' google-chrome --host-resolver-rules="MAP auth.example.com 127.0.0.1" http://auth.example.com/'
echo ""
echo "Or use the launch script on your host:"
echo " ./launch-chrome.sh"
echo ""
exit 0
fi
echo "Found Chrome: $CHROME_CMD"
echo "Launching Chrome with host-resolver-rules..."
echo ""
$CHROME_CMD \
--host-resolver-rules="MAP auth.example.com 127.0.0.1" \
--new-window \
http://auth.example.com/ \
> /dev/null 2>&1 &
echo "✓ Chrome launched!"
echo ""
echo "Access tinyauth at: http://auth.example.com/"
echo "OIDC test client callback: http://127.0.0.1:8765/callback"
echo ""

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validation/nginx.conf Normal file
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events {
worker_connections 1024;
}
http {
# Use Docker's built-in DNS (127.0.0.11) for service name resolution
# This allows nginx to resolve Docker service names like "tinyauth" and "oidc-whoami"
resolver 127.0.0.11 valid=10s;
resolver_timeout 5s;
server {
listen 80;
server_name auth.example.com;
location / {
# Use variable to enable dynamic resolution at request time
set $backend "tinyauth:3000";
proxy_pass http://$backend;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Host $host;
}
}
server {
listen 80;
server_name client.example.com;
location / {
# Use variable to enable dynamic resolution at request time
set $backend "oidc-whoami:8765";
proxy_pass http://$backend;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Host $host;
}
}
}

298
validation/oidc_whoami.py Normal file
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
import os
import sys
import json
import html
import webbrowser
import secrets
import time
from http.server import HTTPServer, BaseHTTPRequestHandler
from urllib.parse import urlparse, parse_qs
from http.cookies import SimpleCookie
import requests
from authlib.integrations.requests_client import OAuth2Session
from authlib.oidc.core import CodeIDToken
from authlib.jose import jwt
# ---- config via env ----
ISSUER = os.environ["OIDC_ISSUER"]
CLIENT_ID = os.environ["CLIENT_ID"]
CLIENT_SECRET= os.environ.get("CLIENT_SECRET") # optional (public clients ok)
REDIRECT_URI = "http://client.example.com/callback"
SCOPE = "openid profile email"
# ---- discovery ----
# Retry discovery in case nginx isn't ready yet
discovery = None
for attempt in range(10):
try:
discovery = requests.get(
f"{ISSUER.rstrip('/')}/api/.well-known/openid-configuration",
timeout=5
).json()
break
except Exception as e:
if attempt < 9:
print(f"Discovery attempt {attempt + 1} failed: {e}, retrying...")
time.sleep(2)
else:
raise
if discovery is None:
raise RuntimeError("Failed to fetch OIDC discovery document after 10 attempts")
state = secrets.token_urlsafe(16)
nonce = secrets.token_urlsafe(16)
client = OAuth2Session(
client_id=CLIENT_ID,
client_secret=CLIENT_SECRET,
scope=SCOPE,
redirect_uri=REDIRECT_URI,
)
auth_result = client.create_authorization_url(
discovery["authorization_endpoint"],
state=state,
nonce=nonce,
code_challenge_method="S256",
)
auth_url = auth_result[0]
code_verifier = auth_result[1] if len(auth_result) > 1 else None
# Cache JWKS for token validation
jwk_set_cache = None
jwk_set_cache_time = None
def get_jwk_set():
"""Get JWKS with caching"""
global jwk_set_cache, jwk_set_cache_time
# Cache for 1 hour
if jwk_set_cache is None or (jwk_set_cache_time and time.time() - jwk_set_cache_time > 3600):
jwk_set_cache = requests.get(discovery["jwks_uri"]).json()
jwk_set_cache_time = time.time()
return jwk_set_cache
def parse_cookies(cookie_header):
"""Parse cookies from Cookie header"""
if not cookie_header:
return {}
cookie = SimpleCookie()
cookie.load(cookie_header)
return {k: v.value for k, v in cookie.items()}
def validate_id_token(id_token):
"""Validate and decode ID token"""
try:
jwk_set = get_jwk_set()
claims_options = {
"iss": {"essential": True, "value": discovery["issuer"]},
"aud": {"essential": True, "value": CLIENT_ID},
}
decoded = jwt.decode(
id_token,
key=jwk_set,
claims_options=claims_options
)
decoded.validate()
return dict(decoded)
except Exception as e:
print(f"Token validation failed: {e}")
return None
# ---- tiny callback server ----
class CallbackHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def do_GET(self):
# Handle root path - check if already logged in
if self.path == "/" or self.path == "":
cookies = parse_cookies(self.headers.get("Cookie"))
id_token = cookies.get("id_token")
# Check if we have a valid token
if id_token:
claims = validate_id_token(id_token)
if claims and claims.get("exp", 0) > time.time():
# Already logged in - show main page
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header("Content-type", "text/html")
self.end_headers()
html_content = f"""
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<title>OIDC Test Client - Welcome</title>
<style>
body {{
font-family: Arial, sans-serif;
max-width: 800px;
margin: 50px auto;
padding: 20px;
background: #f5f5f5;
}}
.main-box {{
background: white;
border-radius: 8px;
padding: 30px;
box-shadow: 0 2px 4px rgba(0,0,0,0.1);
}}
h1 {{
color: #4285f4;
margin-top: 0;
}}
.user-info {{
background: #f9f9f9;
padding: 20px;
border-radius: 4px;
margin: 20px 0;
border-left: 4px solid #4285f4;
}}
pre {{
background: #f9f9f9;
padding: 15px;
border-radius: 4px;
overflow-x: auto;
border: 1px solid #ddd;
}}
.logout-btn {{
display: inline-block;
padding: 10px 20px;
background: #dc3545;
color: white;
text-decoration: none;
border-radius: 4px;
margin-top: 20px;
}}
</style>
</head>
<body>
<div class="main-box">
<h1>✅ Welcome back!</h1>
<div class="user-info">
<h2>User Information</h2>
<p><strong>Username:</strong> {html.escape(str(claims.get('preferred_username', claims.get('sub', 'N/A'))))}</p>
<p><strong>Name:</strong> {html.escape(str(claims.get('name', 'N/A')))}</p>
<p><strong>Email:</strong> {html.escape(str(claims.get('email', 'N/A')))}</p>
</div>
<hr>
<h2>ID Token Claims:</h2>
<pre>{html.escape(json.dumps(claims, indent=2))}</pre>
<a href="/logout" class="logout-btn">Logout</a>
</div>
</body>
</html>
"""
self.wfile.write(html_content.encode())
return
# Not logged in - show login page
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header("Content-type", "text/html")
self.end_headers()
html_content = f"""
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head><title>OIDC Test Client</title></head>
<body>
<h1>OIDC Test Client</h1>
<p>Click the button below to start the OIDC flow:</p>
<a href="{auth_url}" style="display: inline-block; padding: 10px 20px; background: #4285f4; color: white; text-decoration: none; border-radius: 4px;">Login with OIDC</a>
<hr>
<p><small>Authorization URL: <code>{auth_url}</code></small></p>
</body>
</html>
"""
self.wfile.write(html_content.encode())
return
# Handle logout
if self.path == "/logout":
self.send_response(302)
self.send_header("Location", "/")
self.send_header("Set-Cookie", "id_token=; Path=/; Max-Age=0")
self.end_headers()
return
# Handle callback
if not self.path.startswith("/callback"):
self.send_error(404, "Not Found")
return
qs = parse_qs(urlparse(self.path).query)
if qs.get("state", [None])[0] != state:
self.send_error(400, "Invalid state")
return
code = qs.get("code", [None])[0]
if not code:
self.send_error(400, "Missing code")
return
token = client.fetch_token(
discovery["token_endpoint"],
code=code,
code_verifier=code_verifier,
)
# ---- ID token validation ----
# Decode and validate the ID token using cached JWKS
jwk_set = get_jwk_set()
# Decode the JWT - make nonce optional if not provided
claims_options = {
"iss": {"essential": True, "value": discovery["issuer"]},
"aud": {"essential": True, "value": CLIENT_ID},
}
if nonce:
claims_options["nonce"] = {"essential": True, "value": nonce}
decoded = jwt.decode(
token["id_token"],
key=jwk_set,
claims_options=claims_options
)
decoded.validate()
# Convert JWTClaims to dict for display
id_token_claims = dict(decoded)
# Store ID token in cookie (expires when token expires)
token_expiry = id_token_claims.get("exp", 0) - time.time()
max_age = max(0, int(token_expiry))
# Redirect to main page with cookie set
self.send_response(302)
self.send_header("Location", "/")
self.send_header("Set-Cookie", f"id_token={token['id_token']}; Path=/; Max-Age={max_age}; HttpOnly")
self.end_headers()
print("\n" + "=" * 60)
print("✅ OIDC Authentication Successful!")
print("=" * 60)
print("\nID Token Claims:")
print(json.dumps(id_token_claims, indent=2))
print("\n" + "=" * 60)
# Don't exit - keep server running for multiple test flows
# ---- run ----
print("=" * 60)
print("OIDC Test Client")
print("=" * 60)
print(f"\nAuthorization URL: {auth_url}")
print("\nTo test the OIDC flow:")
print("1. Open the authorization URL above in your browser")
print("2. Login with credentials: user / pass")
print("3. You will be redirected back to the callback")
print("4. The ID token claims will be displayed below")
print(f"\nWaiting for callback on {REDIRECT_URI}...")
print("=" * 60)
# Try to open browser (may fail in Docker, that's OK)
try:
webbrowser.open(auth_url)
except Exception as e:
print(f"Could not open browser automatically: {e}")
print("Please open the authorization URL manually")
HTTPServer(("0.0.0.0", 8765), CallbackHandler).serve_forever()